tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7239743979253677932024-03-13T03:58:23.515-07:00Knowledge through the process of eliminationReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-1581984951551999902017-12-17T15:15:00.000-08:002017-12-18T18:53:55.614-08:00The Thomistic Cosmological Argument for God's Existence: An introduction with Criticisms<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Preface</b></u></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">This blog post is a reply to another blogger, David, in an on-going
discussion about the merits of an argument Thomas Aquinas makes for
God's existence. The reply is more in-depth than many would expect
for a non-professional discussion about one of Aquinas's arguments.
This is, in part, because I think our discussion could benefit from
more detail on key terms. But, since this discussion concerns
Aquinas, a prolific writer in his own right who commented and built
on Aristotle, a complex and influential philosopher, a simple
definition couldn't adequately cover some relevant complexities. Yet
despite the length, I hope the engagement with Aquinas, Aristotle,
and Plato brings perspective to a modern discussion about the
existence of God.
</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">I'd like to thank all the people who have patiently listened to me
talk about Aquinas. Being a sounding board has helped me better
understand the material. I value the time everyone has been willing
to put aside, even if it is small. A special thank-you to those who
read the drafts of this work (yes, there were many drafts). And, most
of all, a thank you to David for not being an internet troll, but
honestly engaging with some emotionally difficult issues in a mature
way. I believe that people grow morally when they cooperatively
engage with a community. While we don't have to see eye-to-eye, I
appreciate the willingness to work with others on sensitive and
difficult issues.
</span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Introduction</b></u></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small; text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">This
article comes as a response to a friend's affinity for a particular
strain of arguments for God's existence collectively called the
Cosmological Argument for God's existence. While I am doubtful that
this strain of arguments could make a convincing case for God's
existence, in this article, I outline and criticize one family of
them I call the </span></span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">Thomistic
Cosmological Arguments</span></span></span><span style="font-size: small; text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-weight: normal;">.
These arguments are characterized by their reliance on a metaphysical
position about the nature of objects, which its proponents often
trace to Thomas Aquinas and some of his arguments for God's
existence. </span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">David, through an interpretation of Aquinas's cosmological argument,
developed a version of the Thomistic Cosmological argument.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote1sym" name="sdendnote1anc"><sup>i</sup></a>
As a response to this approach, I spend some time in this article
expanding on the basic metaphysical positions about the nature of
objects often adopted in the development of the Thomistic
Cosmological argument. These metaphysical positions are expanded upon
through an interpretation of Plato and Aristotle's view of the
metaphysical nature of objects, through the lens of Aquinas. After
outlining a metaphysical problem the ancient philosophers set out to
resolve and Aquinas's solution to that problem from his understanding
of Plato and Aristotle, I explain his cosmological argument for God's
existence with an emphasis on what he refers to as his First Way.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">My criticisms of the Thomistic Cosmological argument follows its
development. I take issue with the conception of the metaphysical
nature of objects, and the exceptions made for an understanding of
God. Through an analysis of the argument, I explain why the
foundation for the argument is fundamentally flawed.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Setting the
stage: Change, and the One and the Many</b></u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The question that framed many of the metaphysical discussions for
Aquinas and other ancient philosophers was that of <i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">;
more specifically, “what is </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">?”
Without some context, the modern reader may need clarification on the
question's subject matter. In this section, I provide some context
and clarification with a description of the observations and
questions that originally motivated the medieval and ancient
philosophers. I begin with reflections on change, and a describe the
question of the </span><i>One and Many</i><span style="font-style: normal;">,
then more directly describe the subject matter of </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">,
and finally return to arguments about change. This will provide a
framework to understand the metaphysical system developed by Aquinas
and others used to answer the question of </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">.
</span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Many ancient philosophers reflected on change in objects and were
puzzled by it. They noticed that some objects can change and still be
considered the same object, yet others, if they change, are
considered new or different objects. These reflections on change
concerned both animate and inanimate objects.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote2sym" name="sdendnote2anc"><sup>ii</sup></a>
A pile of sand that is melted into a glass vase, for example,would no
longer be considered a pile of stand in virtue of its different
shape, texture, hardness, etc. On the other hand, there are many
other cases where people continue to refer to an object as the same
despite its many changes. The prototypical example would be the
change we see in plants and animals. Some living beings lose and gain
matter, change shape and color, and can look entirely different over
the course of their lifetime. An acorn looks completely different
from the fully developed tree it will become, and has far more
material than it originally began, but some would still claim that,
though the tree looks different from the acorn, it is still the same
object.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote3sym" name="sdendnote3anc"><sup>iii</sup></a>
That is, while an acorn is not a tree, the two share a continuity
such that the tree could be considered the same object as the acorn,
but with different properties. Yet, in other cases, if enough
qualities change in an object, it would be considered a different
object altogether. The difference in our intuitions about how to
regard objects that have changed was the subject of discussion for
many philosophers. Some like Parmenides, argued that all change is an
illusion. Others, like Hericlitus, argued that everything is change.
Aristotle holds that some objects change while others do not in a
manner roughly inline with our common notions of change in the world.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Similar to the attempt to understand the sameness in objects that
change over time, philosophers were also puzzled about the
relationships between different objects and notions of sameness
between them. The question of the <i>One and Many,</i> for our
purposes here, concerns the observation that many objects, though
they are different, still fall into a concept such that they are
considered the same kind of object. For example, there are a number
of different chairs inside my house. Some chairs are almost identical
in appearance and construction, while other chairs look fairly
different. Yet, despite their differences, they are still all
considered to be chairs. The ancients noticed that, while in many
respects objects can be different, there is another respect in which
they are the same. They wanted understand what about the world or the
objects allows for the identification of sameness between objects.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The <span style="font-style: normal;">questions arising from notions
of change</span> and reflections on the <i>One and Many</i> was
examined through an analysis of <i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
qua </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">. Although
the question of </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
qua </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;"> is abstract,
a basic understanding of being can be built from our practical
relationship to objects. To unpack the subject matter of </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
qua </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">, I'll start
with the familiar. The etymology of the word “being” tracks the
ancient subject matter. The word “being” is just a form of the
phrase “to be.” The most common use of “to be” is in the form
“is,” as in “she is tall,” or “that is a goat.” Thus, to
frame the subject matter in practical terms, our attempt to
understand what an object is is to develop a conception of an
object's </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote4sym" name="sdendnote4anc"><sup>iv</sup></a>
</span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">The subject of </span><span style="font-size: small;"><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
qua </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;"> investigates
the categories or general concepts themselves and their nature or
place in the world. Again, an analysis of the phrase is helpful in
understanding the subject matter. Since </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
has been discussed, the only remaining piece is “qua,” which just
means “in terms of.” Thus, if </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
refers to what something is, then </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
qua </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;"> is a
reflection on what it means to be something. To explain, under the
subject of </span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;"> qua
</span><i>being</i><span style="font-style: normal;">, there are a
number of questions about the identification of my chair as a chair:
(1) Where does the concept of a chair come from? (2) Is the concept
of the chair only in my head, or somewhere else? (3) What is the
interaction, if there is one, between the concept of the chair, and
the chair itself? Each of these questions, along with others, has a
long history of discussion within philosophy, particularly
metaphysics and epistemology (theory of knowledge). </span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas and others, in their discussion of <i>being</i> qua <i>being</i>,
broke the subject into two different, but interrelated, inquiries.
They investigated “to be” in terms of our conceptions of objects,
also known as their <b>essence</b>, and in terms of their <b>existence</b>
itself. The former subject, essence, is typically described as an
inquiry into “what something is.” The latter, existence, is
described as regarding “that something is.” For Aquinas, as
opposed to others, essence and existence are distinct and separate
qualities of objects.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote5sym" name="sdendnote5anc"><sup>v</sup></a>
This distinction between essence and existence comes into play in the
interpretation of Parmenides' argument against the possibility of
change, and Aquinas's argument for God's existence.</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Expanding on the understanding of <i>being </i>from the perspective
of its essence and through an analysis of change, the philosophers
ask under what conditions do things remain what they are, and when
are they are new or different things. More specifically, two
interpretations for the term “change” can be given to reflect
these concerns: (1) An object changes if it has different properties,
but retains its identity; this I will call the continuation
interpretation. (2) Change occurs if there is a different or new
thing; this I will call the differentiation interpretation.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote6sym" name="sdendnote6anc"><sup>vi</sup></a></span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas, like many other philosophers, developed his conception of
<i>being</i> and change through an analysis of non-<i>being</i>.
Parmenides, a contemporary of the ancient philosophers, disagreed
with Plato and Aristotle about the existence of change, and nature of
<i>being</i>. Parmenides thought change didn't exist. Later Arabic
philosophers and scholastic philosophers continued to build and
comment on the analysis of non-being. Since the metaphysics for the
cosmological argument develops out of the continuation interpretation
of change, this article will focus on the continuation
interpretation. Like different interpretations of change, different
conceptions of non-<i>being</i> and/or nothingness open different
kinds of metaphysical questions.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The difference in interpretation of nothingness and/or non-being
hinges on the role negation plays in the distinction. On one
interpretation, within the context of the essence aspect of <i>being</i>,
the use of nothing or non-being analyzes different kinds of objects.
The terms could be simply the application of “not” to either
thing or being. To explain consider the familiar saying “out of
nothing; nothing arises.” Here the interpretation could be that the
“no” is modifying “thing” so that it is equivalently claiming
“out of not-thing, not-thing arises.” While the sentence
construction is awkward and not grammatical, the approach at a
description may be if not familiar, certainly intelligible. The claim
is simply that from like-kind only like-kind can arise. For instance,
from this reasoning, only dogs can arise from other dogs; or, using
the negative, a non-dog cannot arise from a dog. I will call this the
<i>negation as modification</i> interpretation.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Another interpretation of nothing or non-being within the context of
essence could explicate the conception of nothing as a special kind
of thing. On this understanding, the nothing in question refers to
what is left over when all matter is removed from an area; this I
call the void. Since all objects are created, at minimum, from a
combination of matter, an object cannot arise if there is no matter
present. Thus, the saying “out of nothing; nothing arises”
asserts that objects cannot be constructed from the void. This I will
call the <i>negation as void</i> interpretation.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote7sym" name="sdendnote7anc"><sup>vii</sup></a></span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Finally, an interpretation of nothing in the saying “out of
nothing; nothing arises” within the context of the existence aspect
of <i>being</i> refers to the impossibility of the modification of a
non-existent thing. In other words, the saying points out that, if
something does not exist, it cannot be said to come into existence,
since this would imply that there is already a thing which is
modified.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Now that the central terms used in the argument against the
possibility of change have been introduced, the argument can be
introduced. There are a few different presentations of the argument.
For the sake of this article, I'll use David's summary of it:
</span></div>
<ol>
<li><div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Change would require being to arise out of non-being or nothingness,
but</span></div>
</li>
<li><div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">From non-being, or nothingness, nothing can arise, so that</span></div>
</li>
<li><div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Change is impossible
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">There are two interpretations of change, and three interpretations of
nothing and/or non-being described for this article. This article
will focus on the continuation conception of change and examine the
resulting interpretation from the use of a negation as modifier form
of nothing, and the existential interpretation of nothing. These two
interpretations of the text will provide a venue for an examination
of the argument from within the context of the whole/part debate,
powers, and causation. Since Aquinas uses his solutions to some
problems within these topics as elements in his argument for God's
existence, the analysis of these problems will provide a groundwork
for Aquinas's argument for God's existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The interpretation of paradox using the negation as modifier
conception of nothing and non-being will be called the Essentialist
Argument against Change. The argument, on this interpretation, holds
that, in order for change to arise, a property of an object must be
able to change and yet that object retains its identity. If this is
so, a property not currently associated with the object must become
associated with that object. And, moving to the second line of the
argument, a new combination of properties associated with an object
does not make that object. Yet, by definition, change is exactly the
act of making non-object properties, an object's property. Thus,
change is impossible.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In more practical terms, the Essentialist interpretation asserts that
an object with some set of properties cannot lose or gain a property
without creating a new object. For example, imagine that the chair
I'm sitting in is described with a complete list of its properties –
its shape, weight, location, etc. Here one might say that, the chair
is the complete list of its properties. However, according to this
conception, if I move my chair to a different location, there would
be a chair with a different property, and so a different collected
list of properties. If my chair was that previous complete list of
properties, then, with a different list of properties, it is now a
different chair. Yet, for the chair to change, it would need to have
a different property, like a different location, and retain its
identity. If that particular chair simply is the complete list of its
properties, then, by definition, change is impossible.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Under the existential interpretation of the paradox, the argument's
first premise asserts that change requires that something change from
a state of non-existence to existence. However, returning to the
existential interpretation of non-being, in order for a thing to
change from a state of non-existence to existence, there would have
to be a thing which is changing existence. But, if there is a thing
that is changing existence, the thing must already exist, or else
what would be changing? The description of non-existence presumes
that there is no thing to change. Thus, if change is the alternation
of an object from non-existence to existence, change is impossible.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas and Aristotle rejected the conclusions of these paradoxes
that change is impossible. They held that some changes in the
properties of objects, like a chair changing positions, does not
create a new object. Further, they held that new objects come into
and leave existence. For them and others, the rejection of these
principles defies commonsense, and possibly even coherence. Yet, in
order to reject the conclusion, one must re-examine the premises.
Through this examination, they come to some conclusions about the
nature of objects and their existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Resolving
Paradox: Essence, existence, and their manifestations</b></u></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">This section will examine the response to the <i>Paradox of Change</i>
explaining the concepts employed to account for a conception of
change. I begin with the distinction between matter and form in
objects, and explain how it is used to respond to the essentialist
interpretation of the Paradox of Change. After explaining some
nuances to the essentialist interpretation and its response, I
explain actuality and potentiality in terms of its response to the
existential interpretation of the Paradox of change, with a brief
explanation of its connection to a contemporary debate about object's
powers. Finally, I explain how the different concepts introduced in
this section interrelate to each other. This provides the framework
in which to understand the cosmological argument for God's existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas conceives of objects as being composed of two aspects, <b>matter</b>
and <b>form</b>. Matter is that material which one would compose an
object. Form is that aspect of an object which makes it more than a
simply its composition of matter. That is, form is the organizing
principle or aspect that makes matter possess properties that it
would not possess by itself. A bronze statue, for example, has bronze
as its matter, and gains its shape through its form. The form of a
statue organizes that bronze such that the bronze has a shape, and is
not just a lump of bronze. All worldly objects have a combination of
matter and form from which they are composed.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The Paradox of Change, under the essentialist interpretation, is
resolved through the relationship between matter and form. Under this
response, our conception of an object refers to its form. As such,
provided the form of an object does not change, an object will
persist despite its changes. Likewise, if an object no longer retains
its organizing principles or aspect, the object no longer persists.
Under this conception of an object, since changing the position of
the chair in my house does not change its organizing principle or
aspect, the change of position does not destroy the chair. However,
if the chair was taken apart, although all the matter may still
exist, since it no longer retains its organizing principle or aspect,
the chair no longer persists.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">While the matter and form
distinction may provide a satisfactory response to some cases of
change in objects, Aquinas identified some kinds of change that
should be further distinguished. Namely, he noticed that there are
some properties to an object that, if they are lost, would not cause
the object to be destroyed, while other changes would. The changes in
an object that would not cause the object to cease existence are
called </span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;"><b>accidental</b></span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">
change. The changes in an object that would cause an object to cease
existence are called </span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;"><b>substantial</b></span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">
change. For example, an animal that loses the ability to walk would
not be considered to cease existence, even though that animal has
lost an ability. However, if some animal dies, that animal no longer
exists. To Aquinas, since being alive is a necessary condition for an
animal's existence, being alive is a product of its </span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;"><b>substantial</b></span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">
form, whereas the ability to walk is not essential to its existence,
and so is part of an </span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;"><b>accidental</b></span><span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">
form. </span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In response to the existential interpretation of the Paradox of
Change, Aquinas argues for a hierarchical conception of an object's
existence. Rather than objects either having existence or not,
objects have some properties which exist, or are <b>actual</b>, and
others that exist <b>potentially</b>. That is, an object can possess
a property, but, even though that property is not actual, that does
not imply that the property does not exist. For example, a piece of
wood has the ability to burn, but just because it is not currently
burning does not mean that it cannot burn. The property of burning
exists potentially within the object. An object undergoes change when
a potential property becomes actualized. All worldly objects have
actual and potential aspects to the object.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The development of the actual and potential distinction allows for a
response to the existential interpretation of the <i>Paradox of
Change</i> which itself is a threat to the possibility of some
change, even if the distinction between substantial and accidental
forms are granted. Aquinas argues that some change does not undermine
the existence of an object even if that change is considered to be
part of the objects substantial form. For instance, if an object is
considered to be wood, for the sake of argument, we might supposed
that it must have the ability to burn. Yet, the fact that, at some
moment, the wood is not expressing the ability to burn does not mean
it cannot burn. The substantial and accidental forms alone cannot
account for this kind of substantial change. Aquinas holds that there
are actual and potential properties within the substantial form which
would account for substantial change.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In addition to providing a response to the existential interpretation
of the <i>Paradox of Change</i>, the actual and potential distinction
coupled with the matter and form distinction provides an explanation
for powers in objects. <b>Powers</b> are those properties an object
possesses that may or may not be realized through the life of that
object. A bomb, for example, has the ability or power to explode.
Using Aquinas' terminology, we would say that an exploding bomb
exists potentially within the form of the object.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The concepts of actuality, potentiality, matter, and form are all
interrelated in the conception of an object. In the scholastic
jargon, we would say that it is through an object's substantial form
that the properties of an object are actualized in matter. Further,
matter cannot exist without substantial form to actualize it. The
concept of matter without form is called <b>Prime Matter</b>, and
said only to exist as a potentiality. To help visualize the
relationship between the various concepts, consider the following
metaphor: imagine a stain glass window with light shining through the
window and causing an image on a wall. The image on the wall would be
the object we experience in the world. The glass would be the form of
the object, and the light would be existence itself that actualizes
the form of the object. The part of the glass that does not have
light shining through it would be the property of an object that
would be said to exist potentially.
</span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">To recap, following the reasoning of Aristotle and Aquinas, if one
believes that object's change and thus reject Parmenides argument
against change, it follows that objects must have forms (accidental
and substantial), and that there are different ways in which
properties of an object can exist (potentiality or actuality). It is
through our knowledge of the essential and existential qualities of
an object that Aquinas builds an argument for God's existence. </span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Metaphysical
Arguments for God's existence</b></u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">This section will cover some variations on the metaphysical argument
for God's existence with an emphasis on the cosmological argument,
and Aquinas's First Way. I will start with some reflections on the
metaphysical stance on objects connected to Aquinas's view of the
world. Then provide a presentation of his argument for God's
existence from the First Way, and a reflection on his general
existential argument. Finally, I'll provide a general structure to
the various versions of the metaphysical argument for God's
existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">A crucial notion to understanding the approach of the cosmological
argument is that God is considered the foundation of existence
itself. Returning to the stain glass window metaphor, if image on the
wall is the object we experience in the world, God is the source of
light that allows for the image to be cast. He actualizes an object's
potentiality latent within that object's form. This manifests,
through matter, the object that we experience in the world. Aquinas,
in reasoning about the source of light, argues that the stain glass
window could not be its own source of light. The source of light must
come from something entirely different from the objects themselves.
Thus, Aquinas argues that, through our understanding of the world, we
can come to know that God exists.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Within the context of change <span style="font-style: normal;">and the
conceptual framework used to understand it, in the cosmological
argument, Aquinas argues that, based on our understanding of change,
there must be an unchanged changer (unmoved mover). Change as a
potentiality becoming an actuality for an object implies that there
must be another which initiates this change. Since objects cannot be
the source of their own change and there cannot be an infinite
regress, there must be a source for change. </span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">David summarizes the argument as follows:
</span></div>
<ol>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>Change
occurs.</b></span>
</div>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>Whatever
changes is changed by another.</b></span>
</div>
<ol type="A">
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Change is
something existing potentiality becoming an actuality. Only what is
already actual can cause something to go from potentiality to
actuality.
</span></div>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">A thing cannot
be in both actuality and potentiality, at the same time and in the
same way.
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>Whatever
is changeable is changed in the act of changing another.</b></span>
</div>
<ol type="A">
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Now if this
changer is itself chang<i>ing</i> in order to cause this change,
it too must be changed by another (2), and so on.
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>This
series of changers cannot regress infinitely, </b></span>
</div>
<ol type="A">
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">because each
changing changer derives its power to change the next, from the
previous changer in the series.
</span></div>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Therefore, all
such changers are only instrumental changers. Just as boxcars are
instrumental in pulling other boxcars, with no locomotive, no
boxcar would be pulled.
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li><div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>Therefore,
this series of changers must regress to an unchanging changer. </b></span>
</div>
<ol type="A">
<li><div style="font-style: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">By (3), this unchanging changer, or unmoved mover, must be
unchangeable; pure actuality with no potentiality in its being.
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Drawing on the clarification of terms in the preceding sections, the
argument states that substantial change, as the persistence of an
object despite changes in its essential properties, occurs. In order
for substantial change to occur, potential properties in the
substantial form of the object must be actualized. Objects cannot be
their own source of change. Each object that causes change must
itself have a source of change. This chain of changer and changed
cannot go on infinitely. Thus, there must be some entity that changes
but is unchanged.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The argument must specify substantial as opposed to accidental change
to differentiate itself from those cosmological arguments which argue
for a beginning to time, due to the impossibility of an infinite
regress, rather than a metaphysical ground. Aquinas held that a
beginning to time could not be argued on a metaphysical basis.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote8sym" name="sdendnote8anc"><sup>viii</sup></a>
An accidentally ordered series, like time, is like the grandmother
who begets the mother who begets the daughter. While one precedes the
other, one's existence is independent of another. That is, if the
grandmother dies, the mother doesn't necessarily also cease to exist.
The substantially order series is like the table that holds up the
cup. Without the table, the cup would fall. The difference between
these series is that, in the accidental set, the parts can exist
independently of each other whereas, in the substantial set, the
parts cannot exist without each other.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In addition to reasoning that the objects we experience cannot be the
ultimate source of their own existence, Aquinas argues that our
knowledge of existence in objects is indicative of a source of
existence. Brian Davies, respected Aquinas scholar, explains with a
passage in <i>Summa Theologiae:</i></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 0.49in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small; font-style: normal;">Whenever different things share
something in common, there must be some cause of this sharing;
precisely as different, they themselves do not account for it. Thus
it is that whenever some one element is found in different things,
these receive it from one cause, just as different hot bodies get
their heat from one fire. </span><span style="font-size: small;"><i>Existence, however, is shared by
all things, however much they differ</i><span style="font-style: normal;">.
</span><i>There must therefore be a single source of existence from
which whatever exists in any manner whatsoever, whether invisible and
spiritual or visible and material, obtains existence </i><span style="font-style: normal;">[my
emphasis] (pg 31). </span></span>
</div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Similar to the conclusion that, from different instances of objects
of the same type, there must be a singled shared type, like our
experiences of chairs there must be a chairness. The different shared
instances of existence are evidence of a single source of existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The hierarchy to existence within the Aquinas's cosmological argument
is also empirically verified through our interactions with other
objects in the world. Though not in formally part of the cosmological
argument, this belief about the relationship between plants, animals,
and human beings undoubtedly would have provided support for this
position. For Aquinas, plants are above minerals in that they are
able to keep their form while changing their matter. Animals are
above plants in their ability for self locomotion. And, humans are
above animals in that they have control over their forms. Since
objects are actualized through their forms and the greatest being is
one who is Pure Actualization, the hierarchy of actual and potential
found in the natural world, and even beyond it, provides support for
the cosmological argument.</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Finally, all the dots can be connected together for Aquinas's
argument. An object derives its reality as a combination of its
essence and existence. The change we see in the world is an
expression of the relationship between these two. If we believe that
objects change over time, we must believe that they retain their form
and the expression of their form changes. This is to say that an
object's property exists potentially and becomes actual. There must
be a source of this existence. The source of existence is God.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>The doctrine's
challenges: an outline of some criticisms</b></u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The Thomistic approach to the cosmological argument relies on many
interrelated metaphysical positions that do not seem to individually
be a productive approach to their respective problems, and whose
conclusion, that God's essence is existence itself, seems flawed. The
conception of form needed for the argument could not be a solution to
the paradox of change assumes the very problematic entities that it
tries to save. The notion of existence necessary for the argument is
that of a property the very quality it needs to avoid to be a
solution.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u>Criticisms of the Forms</u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The criticisms of the forms presented puts to task our conception of
the form, and what or who has a form. This section presents questions
the nature of the form with the Third Man Argument. If correct, form
cannot be a solution to the Paradox of Change. Next, the
meaningfulness of the form distinction is put to question with the
Sorites Paradox. Without a meaningful distinction, the forms cannot
resolve the Paradox of Change.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The <i>Paradox of Change</i>, and the question of the <i>One and Many</i>
centers around the relationship between particulars and the general,
and how qualities about the two conflict. The <i>Paradox of Change</i>
questions the relationship between an object as a whole and its part
either as parts related to each other at a particular instant, or how
they related to each other at different instants in time. Similarly,
in the <i>One and Many</i>, different aspects of objects (predicates)
have a “sameness” relationship. In the matter and form
relationship, it is the substantial form that gives matter its
meaning or essence. In Plato's theory of the forms, the participation
in the Form gives an object its meaning or essence. Yet, if it is the
substantial form or Form that provides meaning or essence to its
parts or objects, then where does a Substantial form or form get its
meaning or essence? The very same reasoning that gives rise to the
postulation for the substantial form for ordinary objects can be
applied to the substantial form itself.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Traditionally introduced as an argument against Plato's theory of the
forms, the Third Man Argument (TMA) questions the use of the form to
provide an essence to objects while positing the form itself without
providing an explanation for its essence. The TMA claims that,
according to Plato's theory, a man has an essence (being a man), that
is inherited via its participation in the form man-ness. However, the
form man-ness would itself have to be a man. Since the form is itself
a man, there must be a third form man-ness-ness that covers both the
original man and its original form man-ness. The third form would
also itself need a form. Thus, there is an infinite regress of
forms.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote9sym" name="sdendnote9anc"><sup>ix</sup></a></span>
</div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The strength of the TMA comes from the critical stance towards the
relationship between objects and their essences. For Plato,
Aristotle, and others, entities (parts or objects' predicates) obtain
their relationships to each other vis-a-vie their essences. Yet, on a
similar basis, one can question the grounds that establish the
relationship between essences and their object. The solution used to
resolve the relationship between objects and their parts cannot be
used on itself without begging the question or causing an infinite
regress. As a result, a foundational source for essences can never be
established.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote10sym" name="sdendnote10anc"><sup>x</sup></a></span>
</div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas's substantial forms as the entity that instantiates the
relationship between an object and its parts must answer why the
substantial form and its object does not require its own substantial
form. A proponent of the theory may hold that the substantial form as
grounded in the object avoids criticisms that would be made of
Plato's theory of the forms. As an entity that unifies parts into a
whole, a natural conclusion would be to conceive the substantial form
as a part of the object. However, as a part, the substantial form
would itself need a form to unify the substantial form with its
parts.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The argument that objects possess matter and form leans on the
preservation of ordinary objects. Some, in contrast to Aristotle,
argue that atoms are the only things that exist, and, as such,
ordinary objects – like tables and chairs – do not exist. Others
argue that only the world as a whole exists, and everything is simply
a part within the greater whole. For modern Thomists, retaining the
substantial forms of ordinary objects remains an crucial part in
arguing for moral relationships between objects.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The <i>Sorites Paradox</i> is a significant challenge to the
differentiation of ordinary objects.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote11sym" name="sdendnote11anc"><sup>xi</sup></a>
This objection brings to question the methodology used to
differentiate objects and their substantial forms. Consider, for
example, why we cannot fit a full professional football (not soccer)
team into a Honda Fit. Here are two ways a Thomist could reply:
</span></div>
<ol>
<li><div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The substantial form of the Honda Fit and the substantial form of
the football team, as a collective, each provide properties to their
respective matter such that the football team cannot fit in the
Honda.</span></div>
</li>
<li><div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The Honda Fit has its own substantial form, and each person in the
football team has his own substantial form. The individual
properties of each football player and the Honda Fit is such that
the football players cannot fit in the Honda.
</span></div>
</li>
</ol>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">These examples associate the essences of the individuals with a way
in which the objects involved would be referred to. Namely, we can
refer to a football team as a collective, or to the individual
players of the team each with their own properties.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In a fashion similar to the Third Man Argument, responses to this
paradox undermines its own case for the forms, and more importantly
how it will be used in later arguments. A natural response could be
that each football player has an accidental form from which those
players relational properties derive. The collective property is a
product of their respective accidental forms. However, if this is
possible, all objects can be broken into only accidental forms as
simply relational parts and properties resulting from these
relations. Yet, accidental forms are said to not exist independently,
and if all things are simply their parts and relationships, no case
could be made for an inherent purpose existing within the collective.
On the other hand, if the football team as a collective must have
their own substantial form in order to retain their collective
property, then what about the other properties resulting from other
collectives? For instance, if all the football team cannot fit in the
car, then all the football team plus one more person also cannot fit
in the car. A variety of other relationships can be developed each
also with their own respective properties. Each property cannot be
appeal to the accidental properties without falling into the original
fork.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">If the forms are not a viable conception of the composition of
objects, the cosmological argument cannot get off the ground. The
argument about the <i>Paradox of Change</i> assumes that there must
be some entity to which people refer. If an explanation can be
provided without an entity assumed, there is no Paradox to Change and
thus God as a solution to it. Further, not just any conception of the
forms will do. A conception of the forms that does not provide an
account of purpose or meaning results in a God that both does not
instill meaning or purpose in the world, but whose perfection is no
longer worthy of worship or deference.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u>Existence Criticism</u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The influential philosopher Immanuel Kant famously wrote in response
to another argument for God's existence (the ontological argument)
that existence is not a real property. This remark succinctly
captures the central idea behind the objections I find compelling.
Unpacking this quote, there are two aspects to this claim that
motivate the cosmological argument: (1) Existence is a property; (2)
It is a particular kind of property. For the former, many criticize
that, if existence was a property, there would have to be entities
without existence. For the latter, I challenge the conception of
existence as similar to light.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Aquinas, in this response to the Paradox of Change, acknowledges the
motivating criticism behind the conception of existence as a
property. The existential interpretation of the Paradox of Change
finds the idea that a modification can be made to a non-existent
object would be impossible. His proposal is that there are potential
properties which subsist on actual objects. But, this simply proposes
an entity that exists, but whose existence is derived in another
manner. That is, Aquinas would claim that a property exists
potentially, but this is still claiming that it exists. On the other
hand, he could claim that there are potential properties, but that
they don't exist. However, if the properties don't exist, the claim
that an object has those properties wouldn't be meaningful.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The reconciliation of the tension that a modification can be made to
a non-existent entity is that existence, like other properties, comes
in degrees. Just as there are different intensities to light, there
are different intensities to existence itself. Using this conception
of existence but with actuality as a greater degree of existence, and
potentiality as inferior or lesser, prime matter as pure potentiality
exists as the weakest kind of existence, and other creatures with
their relationship to their form and actuality having greater degrees
of existence. God whose essence is existence, and as such is Pure
Actuality. This relationship is further seen through his conception
of the relationship between minerals, plants, animals, humans,
angels, and God.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Existence as a property, aside from the issue with modifying
nonexistent objects, relies on a phenomenon that was previously
explained in terms of existence itself. Namely, an object has a
property with respect to its existence. In particular, an actualized
property would be a property that has existence. However, if
existence is a property, then the property of existence would have to
exist. And, similar to the Third Man Argument, the existence for the
property of existence would also have to exist. This could be said of
all instances of existence. Thus, there would be an infinite regress
of existence. More importantly, the solution to the metaphysical
problem uses the very phenomenon under question as a solution. This
is not a tenable approach to solving the problem.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The supposition that existence is hierarchical, or similar to light,
is not a position that can be given evidence in its support. Even if
its accepted that objects are a composition of form and matter,
existence as separate could be assumed to function analogously to any
other phenomenon in the world. As an independent aspect of objects,
existence theories could be given many different mutually
inconsistent behaviors or properties. For example, our existence
could be like floating a boat on water. Our matter and form are like
the boat, and God is like the water. However, unlike the God that is
like the sun, its only through the existence of the boat that
floating can be achieved. One could assign greater amounts of
existence to different objects consistent with the analogy.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The cosmological argument utilizes the concepts of actual and
potential, by some, without explaining and supporting these concepts.
One possible exposition of these concepts as reflections on the
nature of existence seems problematic. Supposing existence as a
property seems self-defeating, and further description of that
property seems unsupportable.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u>God Whose Essence Is Existence</u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">A common contention with the cosmological argument is that, even if
many of its assumptions are granted, the entity that follows does not
bear enough attributes to be called God. The central criticism here
is that, even if the cosmological argument establishes that there is
a foundational entity grounding existence, the necessary attributes
of this entity does not contain those attributes associated with God.
The entity would not need to have consciousness, be a free agent,
powerful, knowledgeable, or good. The cosmological argument from
within a more robust metaphysical system could argue for these
attributes. In this section, I'll explain why the attributes don't
follow from the argument, and why in the past the attributes of God
may have been more closely associated with the essence of existence.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The criticism of the inference from the essence of existence to God
is that, in short, if other forms do not have the attributes
associated with God, the form of existence as a kind of form, also
would not necessarily have these attributes. Another argument would
need to be provided that links the form of existence to the various
divine attributes. For example, the forms of other entities, though
unchanging despite alternations in their matter, still are not
conscious. The substantial and accidental forms of my chair is only
said to be unchanging despite my chair's changing properties, not
that the form chair-ness has awareness. Further, even if the
chair-ness forms produce the chair properties, the powers of the form
is restricted to its type. A chair does not also give the floor its
powers for instance. The forms, as a solution to the problem of
change, can only be said to be unchanging entities.</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">In addition to restrictions to the form of existence, as a form, the
separation of essence and existence in objects restricts the
entailment from the form of existence. Objects, as realized through
the combinations of essence and existence, contain their properties
within their forms which are realized through their participation in
existence. Since essence is separate from existence, the form of
existence does not itself have the properties found in an object's
essence. Thus, at best, the form of existence only realizes a
property through other object's forms, not in itself. To explain,
there is a difference between superman's ability to fly, and mine.
Superman has the ability to fly inherent to his constitution,
whereas, if I want to fly, I have to use an airplane.<span style="background: transparent none repeat scroll 0% 0%;">
As such, although we can both fly, there is an inherent difference in
our powers. </span>An object that instrumentally realizes some state
of affairs through another does not have an inherent power. God, as
an entity that realizes states of affairs through others, does not
necessarily have powers associated with states of affairs.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Powers obtained through instrumental relationships impacts epistemic
entailment, and may limit an agent's control over the power. Objects'
independence from God in their essence, while retaining a dependence
through existence, would also mean that God need not understand the
essence of an object to enact its existence. The instrumental
relationship between an object's essence and God could mirror the
instrumental relationship between human beings and the objects they
interact with. Returning to my ability to fly, my possession of the
ability to fly does not also entail an understanding of the
principles of flight. Similarly, God, if he does realize objects
through their essence, doesn't mean that he controls the relationship
between objects, nor must he understand the way in which their
essence is realized. Thus, God, as Pure Actuality or the essence of
existence, need not be able to control events nor understand the
forms with which he interacts.
</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The divine attributes typically associated with God (knowledge,
power, goodness) are derived more readily from a metaphysical system
that argues for a Platonic metaphysics, more specifically
Neoplatonic, than an Aristotelian. Yet, a more robust concept of
universals carries with it a heavy price, a more complex metaphysical
system to defend. Plotinus, a founder of Neoplatonism, for example,
held that God is a unity or the One. God, in his system, contains
both the Good and the Intellect, encompasses all forms. The forms are
distinguished from within the unity through the thought of God. The
Good was to act in accordance with one's form. Thus, God, as the
ontological ground of Being, would also have complete understanding
of all forms and embody the Good.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote12sym" name="sdendnote12anc"><sup>xii</sup></a>
However, the Platonic metaphysics must contend with a host of classic
metaphysical challenges some of which have been introduced in this
article.</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The cosmological argument must argue for a God recognizable to the
theist. Most commonly a being that is all powerful, all knowing, and
perfectly good.<a class="sdendnoteanc" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote13sym" name="sdendnote13anc"><sup>xiii</sup></a>
I've argued here that God as metaphysical foundation does not
necessarily entail self-awareness. Additionally, God's separation
from the objects in the world weakens the ability to argue for a
being with the divine attributes. The cosmological argument, as
presented here, even if the requisite ontology of objects is adopted,
cannot successfully argue for a being that would have the divine
attributes. Thus, it fails to argue for God's existence.</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u>Conclusion</u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;">The Thomistic Cosmological Argument for God's existence fails to make
a case for God's existence due to internal problems with his
conception of forms, analogizing existence with essence, and not
sufficiently compensating for the impact rejecting Platonism would
have on the argument. The criticism of the forms simply applies a
classical criticism against Platonism to a Platonized Aristotelian
metaphysics. The criticism of Aquinas's metaphysics of existence
points out that the virtue of existence is its difference from
essence. Analogizing existence to essence takes on the criticisms
made of the forms, and raises questions regarding how existence is
supposed to be different from essence. Finally, an argument for God
built on the Platonic metaphysics that also accepts the criticism of
the Platonism that is supposed to support it must account for the
change in metaphysical grounds. Thus, the Thomistic Cosmological
Argument for God's existence fails.</span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b>Footnotes:</b></u></span></div>
<div style="font-weight: normal; line-height: 100%; margin-bottom: 0in; text-decoration: none;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><u><b> </b></u> </span></div>
<div id="sdendnote1">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote1anc" name="sdendnote1sym">i</a> The
interpretation of Aquinas and his arguments for God's existence
tries to lean heavily on Edward Feser's interpretation. David, in
his blog posts about the cosmological argument, cites and has many
similar arguments to Edward Feser. He has also confirmed that Edward
Feser's positions are similar to his own, with some reservations.
Since I knew that my objections the cosmological argument he
presented would fall outside David's resources to adequately
respond, I've tried to use Feser's positions and arguments as a
measure of David's. However, Feser's details on Aquinas are often
sparse, and organization could use some improvement. Thus, I've also
drawn on other Aquinas scholars. This includes Brian Davies,
Eleonore Stump, John Wippel, and Frederick Copleston.</span></div>
<div class="sdendnote">
</div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote2">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote2anc" name="sdendnote2sym">ii </a>I've
taken the matter and form distinction to apply to all worldly
objects. Others, possibly Eleonore Stump and certainly Jeffery
Bower, seem to distinguish between “stuff” and “things.”
Bower's use of these terms follows Ned Markosian's distinction
between stuff and things. My account of matter and form is more
similar to Wippel's account, which I find has more in common with
Avicenna's metaphysics (see McGinnis, Jon. <i>Avicenna. </i><span style="font-style: normal;">2010</span><i>.</i><span style="font-style: normal;">)</span>. </span></div>
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote3">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote3anc" name="sdendnote3sym">iii</a> The
acorn/tree analogy is used here for a few reasons: (1) Aquinas and
other scholastic philosophers started from an analysis of living
things, and a differentiation between the living and non-living (2)
The metaphysics laid out here is often used to support continuity of
identity for people. The acorn/tree analogy is explicitly used in
medical ethics discussions. (3) Later discussions that build off the
problem of change focus on mereology, identity, and powers.
</span></div>
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="sdendnote" style="margin-left: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;">Modern philosophers (Descartes, Locke, Hume, etc) analyzed
philosophical problems in terms of experiences, rather than the
composition of parts. Feser criticizes this approach to solving
philosophical problems. In keeping with his and David's formulation
of the cosmological argument, I've tried to formulate the argument
by keeping to the acorn/tree analogy. </span></div>
<div class="sdendnote" style="margin-left: 0in; text-indent: 0in;">
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote4">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote4anc" name="sdendnote4sym">iv</a> I'm
implicitly assuming here that the entity that allows for different
objects to be the same category similarly allows an object with
different properties over time to be the same object. This is, in
part, because I've interpreted Aristotle's distinction between
matter and form, as a revision of Plato's conception of the forms.
Rather than positing disembodied forms like Plato, Aristotle posits
that the forms of objects exist in those objects. Aquinas's
Substantial Forms seems to come from this type of interpretation.
This position should allow for the rejection of Platonic universals,
or Ultra-realism as Feser describes it, while still adopting a kind
of realism.
</span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote5">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote5anc" name="sdendnote5sym">v</a> Some
sympathetic to Aquinas's metaphysics don't hold that the distinction
between essence and existence is real. See Brower, Jeffery 2014,
<i>Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, &
Material Objects</i>. FN 39, pg 17. For the sake of this discussion,
I'm assuming that the interpretation of essence and existence as
real is correct.
</span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote6">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote6anc" name="sdendnote6sym">vi</a> Brian
Davies attributes a similar distinction between creation and
preservation to Aquinas. <i>The Thought of Thomas Aquinas.</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
(1993) pg. 34. </span></span>
</div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote7">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote7anc" name="sdendnote7sym">vii </a>Aquinas
held that absolute non-being, what I've described here as void,
could not exist. Wippel, John. <i>The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas
Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being.</i><span style="font-style: normal;">
(2000) pg 72.</span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote8">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote8anc" name="sdendnote8sym">viii </a>Wippel
and Davies both mention that some interpret Aquinas's First Way as
regarding physical motion rather than metaphysical change. I've
adopted the metaphysical interpretation since it is that
interpretation adopted by David, Feser, and many other contemporary
Thomistic advocates.
</span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote9">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote9anc" name="sdendnote9sym">ix</a> Vlastos,
Gregory, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides.” <i>The
Philosophical Review </i><span style="font-style: normal;">63, no. 3
(1954).</span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote10">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote10anc" name="sdendnote10sym">x</a> This
is my brief version of the Third Man Argument (TMA). I've tried to
formulate it to draw closer parallels with Russell's Set Paradox. I
also think there is a strong relationship between the TMA and the
Liar Paradox. There isn't enough space here to draw out how these
arguments are inter-related. Feser argues that his understanding of
the forms is not subject to the TMA because forms exist within their
particulars. However, he does not explain how this resolves the TMA.
</span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote11">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote11anc" name="sdendnote11sym">xi</a> The
Sorities paradox is usually explained as individual parts – like
individual grains of wheat – not having a property that exists
within the whole – like a heap of wheat. The football team and car
relationship is drawing to emphasis this aspect of the paradox.
</span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote12">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote12anc" name="sdendnote12sym">xii</a> This
understanding of Plotinus comes from: Gerson, Lloyd. “Plotinus.”
<i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>. 2012. <Accessed 17
Dec 2017></span></div>
</div>
<div id="sdendnote13">
<div class="sdendnote">
<span style="font-size: small;"><a class="sdendnotesym" href="https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=723974397925367793#sdendnote13anc" name="sdendnote13sym">xiii</a>
Conceptions of God can vary widely, and the cosmological argument is
not the exclusive domain of Catholicism.
</span></div>
</div>
ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-1950736237551018902016-09-10T17:02:00.004-07:002016-09-10T17:02:51.196-07:00Initial Reading and Research on Edward Feser's Aquinas and the history of philosophy <b> </b><br />
<b>Preface:</b> Warning the following is super long. No really, it's super super long. The following is not for the faint of heart...<b> </b><br />
<br />
<b>Hume's Skepticism</b><br />
<br />
A discussion, part of which is posted on my last blog, about Feser's interpretation of the cosmological argument for God's existence prompted me to pick-up at least his book on Aquinas for a more through discussion of his version of the cosmological argument and its relationship to Aristotle. I decided to start with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Beginners-Guide-Edward-Feser/dp/1851686908/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1473530519&sr=1-1&keywords=edward+feser+aquinas">Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide</a>, and read further as the situation warrants. In my reading, I ran across some discussion of Hume and allusions to the history of philosophy that I may disagree with. I figured that there is a good chance other folk have raised similar objections to my initial reactions. While researching some dialogue about these positions, I ran across some discussion on Reddit and some blog posts by Feser. I thought I would post some of my thoughts and findings here for future reference and possible discussion. <br />
<br />
I'll first cover some of passages that I disagreed with and give an explanation of my current position on Hume's argument against causality and some other discussion I found online that was helpful or interesting. Then, I'll cover how it would apply to one of Feser's arguments. Finally, for future reference, I'll leave a link where people discuss the history of philosophy and Feser's claims about it. For those only interested in my opinion, the linked online discussions of history of philosophy lays outlines general concerns I also hold that, if pressed on the subject, would consider pursuing. <br />
<br />
Feser, in his Aquinas book and on his blog, has some discussion of the Hume's skeptical argument against causation and responses to Hume's argument that doesn't strike me as well placed. Feser writes "As has already been noted, for the Aristotelian, efficient causes cannot be understood apart from final causes, and yet modern philosophers (for reasons we will examine presently) tend to deny the very existence of final causes. This seems to be the reason why modern philosophers have, at least since David Hume (1711-1776), tended to think it "conceivable" that any cause might produce any effect or none" (pg. 20). He then goes on to explain that modern philosophers have trouble justifying scientific conclusions. <br />
<br />
Hume's arguments are epistemic arguments against more robust metaphysical positions, rather than against the validity of practical judgements based on casual relationships. In the context of the rationalist positions of his contemporaries, I'd argue that Hume was showing that casual relationships do not have a necessary relationship in the same way that mathematical and logical relationships do. Further, at the time, the test for a logical versus empirical claim was whether it was conceivable that some implied claim could not be true. For example, we cannot imagine a set of all even numbers that does not include some subset of even numbers while still being "a set of all even numbers." This would be incoherent. Yet, a window breaking does not imply anything else in the way "a set of all even numbers" does. Thus, we can conceive a window breaking and no other event. <br />
<br />
Hume also makes arguments against inductive claims that are relevant to Feser's metaphysics. Against inductive claims, Hume points out that, in deriving a general claim from observation of particular cases, we can never develop a necessary relationship between the general claim and particular cases. For instance, while we might observe that no mammal lays eggs, it is conceivable that some mammal does lay eggs (see: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platypus">Platypus</a>). Thus, a general claim, based on induction, cannot be treated like a general claim based on deduction. <br />
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The arguments Hume lays out have no substantial impact on our practical lives and, on a whole comports with our common experience. Over the course of our lives, we come up with general rules and relationships about the world and how to interact with it based on our experiences. These relationships and rules gain credence due to their reliability and can be subject to change. So, it isn't like the skeptic is committed to believing that the world is nonsensical. Rather, s/he just believes that the way in which our experiences are related could be different than originally thought. <br />
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Here's the discussion of causality and Feser on Reddit I found that I thought was interesting. <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/3c99de/are_edward_fesers_criticisms_of_humes_analysis_of/">Reddit: Feser on Hume's causal skepticism</a>. Here are two blogs by Feser on the subject: (1) <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2009/06/hume-science-and-religion.html">Hume, science, and religion;</a> (2) <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2009/06/empiricism-versus-aristotelianism.html">Empiricism versus Aristotelianism</a><br />
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Feser, in his description of Aquinas' first way, explains that the argument is not about claiming there is a first event that sets off all further sequences of events (ie, there must be a beginning to time), but rather that the change from potentiality to actuality must have something that facilitates that change. That is, he tries to answer where a new quality of an object must come from. Feser's answer is that objects already have this quality, but it is brought into existence through an actualizing entity. Feser notes that the potential qualities of an object are independent of a particular conception of physics and biology and that this is a metaphysical thesis, not physical. <br />
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As a metaphysical quality, the claim is that the concept of an object exists as part of that object. The potentiality of the object exists as part of its, yet unexperienced, conception. For example, a particular instance of wood contains woodness and fireness. It is from the concept of wood contain within that particular piece of wood that fire comes into existence. This is why Feser argues against a nominalism about our concepts. Concepts are part of the world apart from our experiences of particulars and do work in the world. <br />
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Going back to logical vs empirical claims, the reason rationalists appeal to claims like those found in logic is because mathematical claims determine our experiences in a way that we would like general concepts to similarly determine these experiences. So, it follows from the logic of our concepts that objects must function in particular ways. Additionally, judging from Feser's blog and book, we have to be realists about concepts (not just particulars) in order to make sense of how we are able to function in the world.<br />
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In order for empirical concepts to function like mathematical concepts, our empirical concepts should not to be subject to change in the way that mathematical concepts are not subject to change. However, as pointed out in both the problem of induction and problem of causality, our empirical concepts do not function like mathematical concepts. So, there is no reason to believe that these concepts function in the same manner as mathematical concepts. Further, our experience of empirical concept development suggests that we don't acquire empirical concepts from a concept "thing" in the world, but generalize about our experiences. Finally, Hume's explanation provides a plausible answer about why it is we come to the wrong conclusions whereas Feser's metaphysics does not. <br />
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<b>History of Philosophy</b><br />
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Feser also claims that, since around the time of Thomas Aquinas, philosophy has gotten off track with no hope of progress without returning to the "Scholastic" framework. Here is a link to the discussion of this thesis: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/429q2v/opinion_on_edward_feser_and_aristotelianthomist/">Edward Feser's History of Philosophy</a>. Since there are particular comments, that were particularly struck home, I've put them below:<br />
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<u>Argument/Summary for Feser's position (by /u/dhspence):</u><br />
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I think the relevant point is that with the Scholastics (culminating ultimately with Aquinas) we had an entirely constructive philosophy, an attempt at synthesis of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Christianity, all building off our common sense interpretations of the world. Grant act/potency, existence/essence, form/matter distinctions--very much a common sensical way of looking at the world--and certain conclusions are logically necessitated. Thomists rightly insist that Plato, for instance, got the theory of exemplary causes right, whereas Aristotle neglected this and left God aloof as "self-thinking-thought" who could never deign to meddle in non-divine affairs. You might say everything up to Aquinas built on Greek thought, whereas immediately after Aquinas, "deconstruction" begins. Ockham with his anti-realism and voluntarism certainly sought to preserve the theological doctrines of the Church, but it really ended up heralding the via moderna, which is certainly "deconstructive" in that it virtually pulled the metaphysical foundations right out from under the Scholastics. From then on, there were attempts at positive construction--that's what Descartes tried to do under the influence of the mathematical/rationalist view of nature espoused particularly by Galileo. That was, more or less, the M.O. of the continental rationalists. In Britain, however, there was another story entirely--you get Bacon and Locke and Berkeley and Hobbes and Hume starting with empiricist premises. Whereas the rationalists were enamored with the mathematical/rational nature of the universe (one aspect highlighted by the scientific revolution and Renaissance thought), the empiricists stressed, obviously, empirical study of nature (the other current of thought highlighted by the scientific revolution). So you get two modes of responding to developments wrought by the scientific revolution, but they are "positive" philosophies only in as much as they scrap everything that had gone before and start from scratch. That was Descartes' whole idea. There is a preliminary deconstruction, then, before the project ever begins--nothing that smacks of Aristotelianism can be admitted. Bacon redefined formal causes as "fixed laws" i.e. the laws of nature (not what Aristotle meant by the term), and of final causes he expressly stated, "inquiry into final causes is sterile and, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing." So metaphysics, for Bacon, is all about "formal causes"--laws of nature. Final causes, whatever they are, do not "increase human utility and power," so they are of no use in his "positive" construction of philosophy. First deconstruct by repudiating the old--Aristotle--and then build from scratch. Descartes also spoke of his goal of making mankind the "masters and possessors of nature"--the first step of this was not to develop a quasi-mathematical metaphysic. That was step 2. Step 1 was to make a deliberate break with the past. While only one of the philosophical giants of the time actually understood what the Scholastics had ever said--Leibniz--at the beginning there was a conscious rejection of formal and final causes: we see this begin to fade after Spinoza, after whose time this was all old news and everyone assumed the early moderns got it right. But they clearly didn't, or, so Kant said. Kant was frustrated on the one hand with the lack of certainty, cohesion, and agreement within the rationalist camp--they had not made good on their promises to develop a purely rationalistic metaphysic. On the other, thanks in large part to Hume, Kant thought that thoroughgoing empiricism led to skepticism with regard to induction and science, and since he had such a high regard for the Newtonian science, he thought a synthesis of these two necessary.<br /><br />And so on. The main point, however, is that "positive" philosophies were indeed attempted after the Scholastics. But it was only after tearing down half of the classical Greek and Scholastic philosophy. There is, then, a clear break, so it is inappropriate to view the history of philosophy as progressing on a single continuum. It was not a constant working and reworking and a natural smooth development and outworking of certain lines of reasoning. The only "smooth" progressions are (1) pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, early medieval (Eriugena), Scholasticism and (2) Scientific Revolution, British Empiricism/Continental Rationalism, Kant, and so on to the present day. But between these two periods there was a clear and deliberate break with the past, such that we can in no way say "it's just another step down the inevitable slide of history that ends in nihilism." Any good Thomist would rather say progression (2) inevitably leads to nihilism, while progression (1) found its zenith in the thought of Aquinas. It is the difference between being able to make sense of the world, and wallowing in skepticism.<br />
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<u>Argument against Feser's position (by /u/wokeupabug)</u><br />
Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Sure, but I think the relevant point is that with the Scholastics (culminating ultimately with Aquinas) we had an entirely constructive philosophy... whereas immediately after Aquinas, "deconstruction" begins.</blockquote>
But this isn't an impartial data point to be offered as a premise supporting your account of the history, it's just a reiteration of your account of the history, the very thing that is in question. The philosophers after Aquinas of course don't agree to this division of the history of philosophy into constructive philosophy up to Aquinas and destructive philosophy after him, nor do the historians who would dispute the interpretation of history you offer here. Furthermore, to deny the constructive character of the projects of Renaissance Platonism and German Idealism is just surreal. And it's little better to deny the constructive character of a long list of other philosophical developments after Aquinas; I would argue all the important ones, but certainly the constructive character of their project is rather upfront in cases like Continental Rationalism, 19th Century Positivism, Neokantianism, and Phenomenology--to give those developments that come first to mind here.<br /><br />The way you'd introduced this notion in the previous comment was to say that "The philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle were the basis for virtually all serious philosophical thought up until the early modern period." But this interpretation does a vast disservice to everything that is novel in Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus; in Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and Eriugena; in Grosseteste, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Roger Bacon; and in Nicholas of Cusa, Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Charles de Bovelles--to list only the greats (though you seem ambivalent about whether the epochal change was in the 13th or instead the 17th century; the way the thesis is given in the present comment, we would have to count Cusanus, Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Bovellus not as epigone of Plato and Aristotle but rather as the first generation of great deconstructors!). On the other side of the equation, it ignores the continued relation pursued to the philosophies of the ancient period throughout the modern period: the Continental Rationalists saw themselves as the loyal heirs of Plato and Augustine, the experimental philosophy in Britain during the early modern period saw itself as the loyal heirs of the Hellenistic Schools, in German Idealism it was again Plato that was seen as the definitive source, and likewise in Neokantianism (e.g., on Natorp's interpretation) and Hermeneutics (e.g., on Gadamer's); phenomenology, first in Brentano and then in Heidegger, understood itself to be following Aristotle.<br /><br />We might wish to reject the modern pretensions of a relation of their efforts to the thought of the classical period, if not on the plainly question begging grounds that we maintain the moderns were wrong, then perhaps on the grounds of a disputatiousness among them, and between them and the medieval past, as the sign of philosophical disunity. But what is good for the goose is good for the gander: the broadly painted notion of an ancient-medieval unity occludes but cannot erase the often emphatic disputes among philosophers in this period, and characteristically--in the medieval period--on this question of their relation to the classical sources. Even within high scholasticism we find such disputatiousness: Thomas only speaks for high scholasticism in the 20th-21st century imagination, while at the time his philosophy faced criticism from across the board- most notably, from Latin Averroists for not being a loyal Aristotelian, from the old Augustinians for not being a loyal Christian, and from the Albertists for having misunderstood or distorted the grand synthesis followed by Albert on something like Avicennian lines. And as we broaden our historical scope beyond the limits of high scholasticism, each step reveals all the more disputes: you've mentioned the via moderna in the 14th century, but well beyond late scholasticism, the central themes of Renaissance Platonism and Renaissance Aristotelianism were that the Scholastics had critically misunderstood or distorted the philosophy of the classics, or likewise in Renaissance Humanism that the Scholastics had critically misunderstood or distorted the thought of scripture and the Church Fathers. Going the opposite direction in history, it hardly needs to be noted how emphatic disputes between Neoplatonists and the Christians sometimes were. Likewise, you say that deconstruction begins with Ockham, but Plato prominently criticized Presocratic notions, Aristotle prominently criticized Platonic, the Hellenistic schools prominently criticized both their antecedents and each other, the Neoplatonists prominently criticized Aristotle... Of course, there were constructive relations between them as well, but this is also true of the philosophers you want to call destructive: even Ockham, your first exemplar, understands himself to be deeply Aristotelian (more than, say, Bonaventure did).<br /><br />If attributing a unity to philosophy prior to the modern period requires us to repress the rich diversity and lively disputatiousness of its thought, and the sincere novelty of many great accomplishments made after Aristotle, this is a notion of unity our history of philosophy should do without. And if the virtues of modern philosophy, or the seriousness with which we take the modern's orientation toward the classic sources, are impugned by the disputatiousness of the moderns, then by the same principle and with as much force we're obliged to impugn the medievals.<br />
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Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
From then on, there were attempts at positive construction--</blockquote>
If you admit this, I'm not sure what is left of your construction up to Aquinas/deconstruction after Aquinas hermeneutic. Or rather, I take it that you'll try to salvage this hermeneutic in the face of obvious constructive efforts after Aquinas by arguing for the unity of philosophy pre-Aquinas and its disunity post-. But as for this thesis, see the preceding remarks. And the proceeding ones:<br /><br />
Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
From then on, there were attempts at positive construction--that's what Descartes tried to do under the influence of the mathematical/rationalist view of nature espoused particularly by Galileo. That was, more or less, the M.O. of the continental rationalists. In Britain, however, there was another story entirely--you get Bacon and Locke and Berkeley and Hobbes and Hume starting with empiricist premises.</blockquote>
This oft-repeated folk history of philosophy doesn't actually end up doing an adequate job. (It's actually a contrivance of Kant's, and serves a rhetorical purpose in explaining his philosophy as he understands it.) In fact, the major works of British philosophy in the early modern period are not autonomous of the works of Continental philosophy, but rather tend to be developed in explicit response to the latter. Newton is expressly and prominently responding to Descartes, Hume is expressly and prominently responding to Malebranche. Locke is often read as expressly and prominently responding to Descartes, though actually he's probably responding to the Cambridge Platonists--who disappear from the history in this Continental Rationalism vs British Empiricism interpretation, but who represent an important philosophical trend much more like the common view of rationalism than of empiricism, yet they are dominant in 17th century British intellectual culture (all the more evidence of the poverty of this interpretation).<br />
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Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
So you get two modes of responding to developments wrought by the scientific revolution, but they are "positive" philosophies only in as much as they scrap everything that had gone before and start from scratch.</blockquote>
They don't: the Continental Rationalists were thoroughly indebted to Augustine, Renaissance Platonism, and Second Scholasticism, the Empiricists to Renaissance Humanism and the revival of the Hellenistic schools. No one these days reads renaissance philosophy (and the way it disappears in the kind of hermeneutic you suggest is partly to blame), so these details don't leak into the folk philosophy of history that represents a kind of received view, but we shouldn't let that be our metric for considered history.<br />
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Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
There is a preliminary deconstruction, then, before the project ever begins...</blockquote>
Furthermore, insofar as there was a significant break or new beginning
with the early modern period--and we should certainly say that there
was, while rejecting the larger framework of your historical
interpretation--there was likewise a significant break or new beginning
with the early medieval period. The point is a banality in the history
of other disciplines, but remains an obscurity in the history of
philosophy, again, because hardly anyone reads late antique/early
medieval philosophy, so its details don't leak down to the received
view. But certainly there was a break: Christian ideas about nature
having a history, about the individual's life-history being the unit of
moral interest, and generally of development as an interpretive
framework, represent a decisive break with the ancient view, and in a
way that would be determinative of many of the important developments in
culture even into the modern period; likewise, Christian ideas about
inwardness, freedom, the cultivation of the passions, and universalism
were a decisive break which introduced an anthropology unthinkable to
the ancients. It's a great shame that these epochal contributions of
Christian thought are not better known as such; and it's a great shame
supported by one of the peculiar ironies of the sort of interpretation
of history you offer here, where what is crucial and distinctive about
medieval philosophy gets repressed in the aim of representing it as
unitary with ancient philosophy, so that both may be opposed to the
modern. The irony is that what thinks of itself as a defense of
medieval thought ends up doing a greater harm to it than its enemies
could have done.<br />
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Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
There is, then, a clear break, so it is inappropriate to view the history of philosophy as progressing on a single continuum.</blockquote>
There is a break between the early modern and the medieval view, but
there is also a break between the ancient and the medieval view; for
that matter, there is also a break between the early modern and the
later modern view. What there isn't is a progression up to Aquinas and
then a regression down from him; or at least, this isn't clear from any
impartial facts of the matter you've suggested here.<br />
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Quote:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Any good Thomist would rather say progression (2) inevitably leads to nihilism, while progression (1) found its zenith in the thought of Aquinas. It is the difference between being able to make sense of the world, and wallowing in skepticism.</blockquote>
I know you mean that the good Thomist would say this (actually, it seems to me that this criterion would make some of the important Thomists of the 20th century not good Thomists, and that the interpretation you give here is associated particularly with a High Anglican theology, the specifics of which have tended to be opposed by Thomists; but for sake of discussion let's agree to call the sort of view you've described here as the view a good Thomist would have), but the question was what reason the good reader has to believe it.<br /><br />I mean, I kept expecting you to be defending this thesis throughout your comment, so I was reading what you had written as if it were meant as such a defense. But all you seem to have argued for is a split between an ancient-medieval tradition of philosophy and a modern tradition. Except that you exaggerate the unity of the ancient-medieval tradition (both with respect to not seeing any break between the ancient and medieval period, and with respect to the degree of unity you see within each), exaggerate the unity of the modern tradition (at least with respect to not seeing the break after early modernity), exaggerate the disunity between the early modern and medieval periods (which certainly involves a break, but nothing so absolute as you've depicted it), and kind of lose renaissance philosophy in the ambivalence produced by wanting to make Aquinas your apex and the early moderns the great folly (when there are four hundred years between them)... this is a fine enough thesis. But it doesn't seem to get us anywhere near to the thesis that any modern philosophy leads inevitably to nihilism and skepticism, whereas ancient-medieval philosophy leads inevitably to Aquinas, whose philosophy is what is needed to make sense of the world--and surely that's the thesis at the core of the contention here.<br />
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I take it that the sort of reasoning you would offer in support of this
thesis about the relative virtues of the ancient-medieval versus modern
traditions is indicated by what you said in <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/429q2v/opinion_on_edward_feser_and_aristotelianthomist/d20y0nc" rel="nofollow">the previous comment</a>, where you wrote:<br />
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Quote: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The early modern philosophers, most notably Francis Bacon and Descartes, repudiated formal and final causes thinking them unnecessary to scientific advancement and man's control of nature. Essentially all of modern philosophy, then, is the logical outworking of this fundamental rejection: if we say that natures/essences are not a real feature of reality, then, as Hume saw, all sorts of "perennial" problems in philosophy arise (note that these were never problems for anyone pre-17th century). The mind-body problem thus arises, the problem of skepticism, the problem of induction, problem of objectively morality, problem of intentionality--all of these are symptomatic of modern thought and would never have been seen as even remotely problematic given the realist metaphysical picture espoused by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and virtually everyone else (save the sophists and atomists and their followers).</blockquote>
<br />I don't want to sound unduly dismissive, but I honestly don't know how to interpret this claim which makes it both sensible and not egregiously mistaken: these problems are prominent in ancient philosophy, and indeed famously so.<br /><br />Aristotle spends the whole first book of De Anima surveying the history of the mind-body problem, and his own response to it takes up the first half of the second book. This problem is also one of the central themes of Plato's Phaedo, which likewise discusses some of its history. And skepticism--there's famously two entire schools of skepticism predominate in the Hellenistic period; Aristotle confronts skepticism in multiple prominent places--e.g. his response to the skeptic on the law of noncontradiction in the Metaphysics; skepticism is raised as a problem in Plato's dialogues both structurally through the frequent use of an aporetic method and directly through the dialogical presentation of skeptical views--e.g. in the Theaetetus which not only gives skeptical rejoinders to multiple theories of knowledge, but ends in an aporia about the possibility of satisfactorily solving this problem. Augustine writes a whole book against the skeptics, the Neoplatonic tradition concludes in Damascius' engagement with skepticism... Or the problem of objective morality: a central preoccupation of the Presocratics, in the form of the nomos v phusis debate; a central preoccupation of Plato's, again presented both structurally in the themes and method of the dialogues, and directly- perhaps most famously in Euthyphro and Republic...<br /><br />I just don't know how to make sense of the thesis that the ancients didn't think there were any meaningful problems about the mind-body relationship, skepticism, or objective morality. My only guess would be that you mean that these aren't problematic not in the sense that no such problems were recognized as significant, but in the sense that the ancients thought, and reasonably enough, that they had good solutions to them. NB: this is, in significant cases, obviously not true (e.g. the skeptics, of course). But in any case, this is another goose and gander situation: if we don't think of Aristotle as troubled by the mind-body problem because he thinks he has a solution to it, we can no more think Descartes, Hume, or Kant troubled by it--under pains of stark inconsistency.<br /><br />Note also that Descartes doesn't repudiate formal and final causation, but only their supposed role in the methodology of natural science. He takes it that final causality is the subject matter of theology and ethics (we might say psychology). And he famously argues for an essence of mind and an essence of matter--it's just that this matter of essences is approached as part of the metaphysical foundation of natural science, rather than as part of the ongoing work of natural science. Even Hume--although this embroils us in some extended interpretive disputes--seems not to repudiates the reality of essences, but only to question how we could come to know them.<br />
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You also explain the thesis this way (Quote):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The problem is, Feser contends, modern philosophy and its metaphysical assumptions, especially its anti-realism, ends ultimately in irrationality and absurdity. There can no longer be any objective ground of morality (read MacIntyre's After Virtue for a full treatment of this), and, given materialism, reason itself is undermined--he comes to this conclusion by arguing that eliminative materialism is the only real materialist option, and eliminativism is, ultimately, self-defeating.</blockquote>
But most philosophers even today, let alone throughout the modern
period, maintain that there is an objective morality, and some of the
most influential defenses of this idea are formulated by moderns. And
even if eliminativism were the only coherent materialism (of course,
most materialists would contest this premise), modern philosophy has
also not characteristically been materialist--so this would be no reason
to indict all of modern philosophy with the failures of eliminativism.<br />
You even note this further down, recognizing alternatives to
materialism as prominent options in modernity, but you seem not to
realize that this critically undermines your argument that the modern
must be an eliminativist to be consistent. Though, you wrongly identify
substance dualism as the only alternative to materialism, when a
property dualism might be a coherent alternative to materialism, while a
variety of neutral monisms, idealisms, and skeptical positions are
certainly alternatives.<br />
Another oddity: your argument here seems to treats "anti-realism" as
interchangeable with "materialism", but it's more natural to see them as
mutually exclusive than as interchangeable.ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-29691421581836115332016-08-30T19:06:00.000-07:002016-08-30T19:24:52.029-07:00Aquinas' Cosmological Argument: A Response to a Defender<span style="font-size: small;"><br /><br /><b>Preface</b> <br /><br />This blog is a response to two blog posts made by an acquaintance recently. His first post is <a href="https://testing521.com/2016/07/19/if-change-occurs-then-god-exists/">Change Happens. Does that mean God Exists?</a> and second, <a href="https://testing521.com/2016/08/22/how-is-that-god-objections-and-responses-to-the-argument-from-change/">How is that God? Objections and Responses to the Argument from Change</a>. This was originally written as a Facebook comment that, after it was written and published, seemed to warrant moving the discussion to a longer format writing platform. I've tried to modify some of the writing to fit the format, but my use of "you" will remain. I haven't yet decided if in the future I should refer directly to the blogger, or respond from the third person. <br /><br /> Due to the breadth of the subject material covered in the blogs, I picked out a few quotes that stood out, and commented on them. Also, I've struggled with the formatting due to my copy and paste from Facebook. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span> <span style="font-size: small;"><b>First Blog </b> </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: small;">Quote<b>: </b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">Change is something existing potentiality becoming an actuality. Only what is already actual can cause something to go from potentiality to actuality.<br /><br />Comment:<br />If we end up agreeing that there would have to originally be an entity that caused everything to go from potentiality to actuality, it doesn't mean that the uncaused cause created all potentiality. The argument hinges on the relationship between things transitioning between states, but doesn't comment on potentiality itself. Since the goal of the argument is typically to show that an entity that not just caused the events to begin but caused everything to exist, the argument would fall short.<br /><br />I would guess the response to this criticism would have to posit qualities of potentialities that are beyond our experience. Since we simply have experience of things changing from potentiality to actuality, much of the proposed qualities of potential entities would be unfounded speculation.<br /><br />Quote: <br />Whatever is changeable is changed in the act of changing another<br /><br />Comment: </span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">By this premise, in order to change something, one must change himself. This means the unchanged changer is either (A) an exception to the rule, whatever is changed must be changed by another, or (B) both the changer and not the changer at the same time.<br /><br />If we are going to say a contradiction exists, or an exception to a rule exists, why this exception and not another? Or, why not admit to the many other contradictions we could imagine as solutions? We could assume that there is an entity that has both potentiality and actuality which caused everything. It would be an exception to the rule, but so is the proposed solution.<br /><br />Quote:<br />At the very least, it is nothing material, nothing with dimension or extension, nothing with quantity or measure. It is nothing inert, but it is active – since it changes all things changeable. It could be nothing temporal, because it is utterly unchanging. There can be only one such being, even in principle, since as Parmenides showed us, being is only differentiated by potency. So pure being, or pure act, would be utterly one and undifferentiated.<br /><br />Comment:<br />(1) You say that the proposed entity has no quantity or measure, but then go on to talk about it as a thing separate from other things. If something has no quantity, it cannot be referred to as a thing, since that implies it could have a quantity of one. <br /><br /><br />The reference to an undifferentiated one could refer to everything in existence. This would possibly be compatible with Parmenides view of the world, but probably not the view of God Aquinas is trying to show. The view that God is a part of everything, in the sense described here, would be a kind of Pantheism. <br /><br />(2) On a different note, to describe something as unchanging is to refer to its state from one moment to the next. That is, we say, for some length of time, the thing didn't change. If the entity exists outside of time, we cannot ascribe the attribute of unchanging to it since that description assumes it existing in time.<br /><br /><b>Second Blog</b></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: small;">Quote: <br />Intelligent changers, with respect to intelligence, are never the instruments of changers that are non-intelligent. But the reverse is often true. In other words, the creation of information always requires a mind, and a student is always taught by a teacher. To add or create information, requires a mind. A person can program a computer, or teach another person to do so, and the computer can copy and process information, but a computer will never generate new information, nor use a human mind as an instrument to do so. But all changers, even intelligent ones, are instruments of the first Unchanging Changer. Therefore, the Unchanging Changer must also be intelligent.<br /><br /><br />Comment:<br />(1) The claim that only intelligent beings create information seems to be untrue. Machine learning programs come up with strategies for solving problems and beating each other and human opponents without humans explicitly programming a solution into them. These methods are inspired off how the brain functions. So, an "unintelligent" thing does create new information. Also, the information in DNA is changed through random mutation. This is another unintelligent process that creates new information. <br /><br />(2) The argument would benefit from some clarity about what an intelligent changer entails. Sometimes it seems like you are referring to agent causation, but then start discussing minds and possibly the hard problem of consciousness.<br /><br />There are a few different ways I can guess at what's trying to be argued. Some discussion about how intelligence is related to the argument would clarify things.<br /><br />The above said, if I were to guess, the argument is drawing on the experience we have of turning potentialities to an actuality. It proposes that we are the only types of things that cause the change from potentiality to actuality without a sufficient previous causes. So, based on this experience, the original cause would be a being that is like us.<br /><br />If it is agent origination that satisfies the requirement for universal origination, there is nothing about knowledge or overarching abilities that would also be required in satisfying this requirement. For example, I can cause an explosion without necessarily understanding why a thing explodes. And, I can cause an explosion without intending to do so. Further, the fact that I caused an explosion doesn't mean I can do a miriade of other things other people can do - like play an instrument. Thus, the fact that a being caused everthing to exist doesn't mean it is particularly intelligent or can do even things that we can.<br /><br />(3) The claim "Intelligent changers, with respect to intelligence, are never the instruments of changers that are non-intelligent" on the face of it seems untrue. Under the influence of drugs or other psychological events, people's actions can be directed by non-intelligent causes. For example, someone that had a tramatic experience with a spider could react to seeing spiders without reflection. There are many experiments that show people can be influenced, or even caused to act, by non-intelligent causes.<br /><br />I also do see how this strong claim fits into the argument. You can have agent origination and have people be the instruments of changers that are non-intelligent. It seems like you are trying to anticipate free will skepticism, but this seems like an untenable position.<br /><br />The Kant Objection:<br />Kant argues that our understanding of the world is based on our constitution (spacial-temporal beings) and our experiences. So, we cannot describe things in terms that are independent of these concepts. For example, when we describe something as existing the concept of existance presupposes a spacial-temporal framework. To illustrate, if someone said John exists, but said that he exists at no time or place. We would wonder in what sense it means for him to exist. In fact, when we say that God exist outside time and place people typically think of God as existing in all of time and space - not outside it.<br /><br />Kant's metaphysical and epistemic position comes out of an objection to an empiricism and rationalism that, particularly radical empiricism, is not really held today. His comments on metaphysics and epistemology has inspired many thinkers such that it is dubious that to agree with some of Kant's objections means that one must then accept all his positions. In fact, there are many different ways people have of conceiving Kant's larger system. For example, Dan Robinson, a professor at Oxford, argues that Thomas Reid and Immanual Kant have very similar positions on the world. Yet, many supporters of cosmological arguments seem to adopt Reid's metaphysics and epistemology.<br /><br /> There's more to be said about the history of metaphysics and epistemology, and Kant's view on them than I've said here, but whole books written just on pieces of Kant's work. I would strongly recommend, if you want to talk about him, reading the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) article on the The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). The article provides a good overview of some thought on CPR. I think an overview would show that even arguing for "Kant's epistemology" could entail arguing for some pretty different systems. </span>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-33176207010212112172012-01-26T12:03:00.000-08:002012-01-26T12:20:56.876-08:00Some Reflections on Ethical Reasoning<!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <o:officedocumentsettings> <o:allowpng/> </o:OfficeDocumentSettings> </xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml> <w:worddocument> <w:view>Normal</w:View> <w:zoom>0</w:Zoom> <w:trackmoves/> <w:trackformatting/> <w:punctuationkerning/> <w:validateagainstschemas/> <w:saveifxmlinvalid>false</w:SaveIfXMLInvalid> <w:ignoremixedcontent>false</w:IgnoreMixedContent> <w:alwaysshowplaceholdertext>false</w:AlwaysShowPlaceholderText> <w:donotpromoteqf/> <w:lidthemeother>EN-US</w:LidThemeOther> <w:lidthemeasian>X-NONE</w:LidThemeAsian> <w:lidthemecomplexscript>X-NONE</w:LidThemeComplexScript> 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mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0in; mso-para-margin-right:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0in; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} </style> <![endif]--> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family: "Arial","sans-serif";color:black">Note: The below entry is not the writing I have been slowly pecking away at for the last 6 months. Rather, they are some thoughts that have occurred to me in the process of writing along with a few other miscellaneous topics.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">To begin, a bit of genealogy on the development of my current intellectual adventure: as many of my projects, the response comes from a question posed to a friend about whether ethics, or morality (I don’t remember which), is relative or objective. My two knee-jerk reactions to the question are that, first, this is not the proper dichotomy: they are not mutually exclusive in the way the question implies; the contrast usually presented as either objective/subjective, or absolute/relative. (I later found that this confusion is not uncommon, even among professional philosophers. I believe the confusion stems from the conjunction of some first and second order ethical positions.) Second, while I have a proclivity toward ethics as objective (though not real), the overall line of discussion is not productive in working out ethical dilemmas, or resolving the meta-analysis of positions. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">I would like to be able to argue that, like many classifications of people’s positions, the labels absolutism, relativism, objectivism, and subjectivism are not helpful in determining what position one may have on a particular ethical topic. For example, if someone self-identifies as a moral relativist, some may conclude that the person believes abortion is permissible. However, the person may believe that the moral and legal realms are distinct and hold that, while nothing can be meaningfully said about its morality, it should be illegal. Or, it could be that it could not be true that abortion is wrong, due to beliefs about ethical propositions and truth, but hold that abortion is, nevertheless, morally impermissible. For those familiar with the diversity of philosophical positions, this shouldn’t come as a surprise, or even be controversial. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">My writing project tries to articulate the range of beliefs one may have while maintaining one of these labels. In familiarizing myself with the field, my reading has included <i>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</i> by Bernard Williams and <i>Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong</i> by J. L. Mackie. While reading and writing on the subject, I’ve realized that the more commonly debated topic is not what positions people hold, but which can be consistently be held, or even which are correct. Understandably, this is the more interesting and substantive claim. As a result, I’ve wanted to engage the subject matter at this level, though I have not. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">In thinking about the change in topic, I realized that the problem with the writing project as a survey of possible ethical positions takes no regard for the rational plausibility of a belief set. The resulting argument from the initial line of reasoning is the more trivial position that it is possible for any person can have any set of beliefs. This is an obvious fact about consciousness. However, this is less than the more substantive position demonstrated in the above example. Thus, to reframe my point, borrowing from Mackie’s terminology, some particular first order ethical position does not entail some subset of second order ethical positions, or vise-versa.[1] Further, the terms themselves are not particularly enlightening to one’s position within their respective conceptual territories. In other words, my position may be more similar an argument Williamson recently made in his recent NY: Times’ article “</span><a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/what-is-naturalism/"><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:#000099">What is Naturalism.</span></a><span style="font-size:11.5pt; line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black">” I also recently ran across the book <i>Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis</i> by Richard J. Bernstein which seems to touch on the subject I’ve been ruminating on. If this is the direction I’m headed, maybe I should just start reading <i>Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature</i> (Rorty) and engage in that debate. After all, I’ve been meaning to read Rorty’s book for sometime. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">The line of research may be too much of a diversion from my other interests. David Gauthier’s book <i>Morals by Agreement</i> turned me on to the notion that our moral concerns are an expression of problems with economic </span><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Externality"><span style="font-size:11.5pt; line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#000099">externalities</span></a><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black"> and/or the </span><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma"><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:#000099">prisoner’s dilemma.</span></a><span style="font-size:11.5pt; line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black"> Along these lines (I think), Amartya Sen has done some work with the failure of markets to meet the needs of people (<i>Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation</i>). Both Sen and Martha Nussbaum are working on a conception of capacities in terms of positive freedoms that relates back to the previous work in poverty and famines, though Nussbaum has a different perspective/focus than Sen. Following this line of thought, many of our more pragmatic ethical problems can be productively addressed through other work in externalities (see <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>, Ostrom, and <i>Social Choice and Individual Values</i>, Arrow). Economists, along with others, work in rationality with regards to the prisoner’s dilemma could help produce systems that motivate people to be more moral. That is, by working on how to reduce free riders, we can further refine our welfare system so that less take advantage of it. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">In a sense, the viability of the work in externalities with regard to resolving moral problems relates to my conclusions about the discussions surrounding moral relativity, and more generally metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy. That is, I take a pragmatic approach to resolving ethical dilemmas in part due to the inability for some lines of discussion to produce substantive conclusions. The skeptical stance toward the relationship between an ontology for, or from, ethics is, in part, the subject matter of my current writing project. </span><br /><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">Best, </span><br /><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">Ryan </span><span style="font-size:85%;"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; color: black;"></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:85%;"><span style="font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black"> </span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">[1] </span><span style="font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"; color:black">Here’s Mackie’s description of first and second order positions: “..first order moral views, positive or negative: the person who adopts either of them is taking a certain practical, normative, stand. By contrast, what I am discussing is a second order view, a view about the status of moral values and the nature of moral valuing, about where and how they fit into the world” (16, <i>Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong</i>).</span></span><span style="font-size:11.5pt;line-height: 115%;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black"></span></p>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-28541527512927352182011-05-07T22:37:00.000-07:002011-05-07T22:43:26.400-07:00Abortion: Does the Soul matter?<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;">A popular pro-life position is that people obtain their moral standing at conception or very shortly after. However, the reason they have moral standing at conception, and not some later date, can vary. This post will focus on those arguments that maintain that the soul entering the body at conception is the relevant quality for moral standing. More particularly, it is this fact that makes abortion immoral. In addressing this position, I will explain some conceptual hurdles that the advocates must address and why I find arguing for moral obligations via the soul unproductive.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"> A simple version of the soul argument against abortion can be made in four steps: 1) killing an innocent person is murder; 2) all things with souls are persons; 3) fetuses have souls; 4) thus, killing a fetus is murder. The driving intuition here is that what makes people different from other animals, and responsible for our actions, is our soul. Many believe that our identity resides in our soul and we retain our identity throughout our lives which extends back to the moment we are conceived. Now, for the sake of brevity, I have assumed that people have souls, and explain why I nevertheless find this popular pro-life position unconvincing.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"> Although my soul is the substance that contains my identity, how people enter the world is still not resolved. Our souls could be created (or enter) after our bodies develop beyond a particular point. Just as a human soul would not enter an insect and become a person (at least by many Christian theologies), the soul may wait to enter the body until it has been properly formed. This line of reasoning tracks the intuition that I am different from my body. Certainly I existed before my body and will exist long after it has rotted away. In short, before the soul enters the body, the primary moral concern should not be to have a child as soon as possible, but the life that the child will enter into. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"> For those that believe I am me only in the unity of the body and soul, the questions concerning the development of the body, and its relationship to identity still stand. If we must have a body to be a person, the type of body would still be at issue. For example, without the ability to think, it seems implausible to refer to the unthinking thing as a person. Further, would this unthinking being be accurately called me? I don't think so. And, I believe that our other moral intuitions about our relationship between those things with souls, and those without, agree with this assessment. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"> The underlying problem with the pro-life position from the belief in a soul is that, while it is a unique feature of human beings, there doesn't seem to be a reason to treat this property of persons differently than other qualities that make us stand out. In particular, it would seem that, while having a soul could be morally relevant in a moral consideration, the existence of the soul does not have the effect that the pro-life advocate desires. Consider, for example, how we ought to treat animals. Although we may disagree about whether killing animals is wrong, far more agree that the mistreatment of animals (abuse and negligence) is wrong. And, it would be wrong even if we were to conclude that animals have no souls. I might not believe that dogs have an after life, but this doesn't mean I can take my frustration at work out on my dog. Thus, possessing a soul is not a necessary condition for moral consideration. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"> The soul is not a sufficient condition for the kind of moral consideration needed for the pro-life position. That is, just because something has a soul does not mean that the destruction of that thing is on par with murder. For instance, if we believed that a house had a soul, the destruction of that house, while possibly not good, would not be equivalent to killing a person. Our intuitions about the destruction of a house versus killing a person is different because the physical properties of the house and a person are very different. It is these properties that make the difference in our moral determination. Similarly, the treatment of an unformed body with a soul is different than the treatment of a fully formed body with a soul. Hence, the fact that something has a soul is not sufficient to determine whether the destruction of that thing is murder.<br /></p><p style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"><br /></p>Keep the love,<br />RyanReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-13501124461020067012011-04-28T19:29:00.000-07:002011-04-28T19:35:37.764-07:00Abortion: The death of the potential person<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The last 6 months or so I have been researching the morality of abortion. My interest in the subject was peaked from some thinking I had done on the moral status of future persons, and animal rights; reasoning about the former seemed to have potential as the basis of an argument for the immorality of abortion. The latter touches on some moral intuitions I have about the rights of animals, and arguments against a social contract theory of morality. Additionally, apart from the appeal on an abstract level, the fact that one's position on abortion has an impact on the world that is not true of other philosophical arguments. So far, my research in the field hasn't proven to be productive in the manner that I expected. I thought there would more reasoning about the relationship between different qualities and how, or why, those qualities include/exclude things from moral consideration. What I have read so far, though admittedly small, has concentrated on our intuitions about either the right to life, or what kind of obligations are entailed by the right to life. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">There are two lines of reasoning for the anti-abortion position that I am most familiar: the moral standing of life before conception, and the moral standing of life after conception. The argument I hear most frequently usually falls into the latter category, and those of the former are usually considered as a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. Now, there is good reason for looking at moral standing before conception argument as absurd. For my approach to the subject, I'll just make the strongest argument from the preconception position, then move to why it cannot ultimately support the anti-abortion position. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The preconceptionist (for lack of a better term) argues that people are destined to be born before the act of conception. If one prevents conception from taking place, that person is killing that child. Or, one might argue that we have an obligation to future generations to not intentionally harm them. If we prevent some people from being born, we have done those people the greatest harm. For example, if someone had the cure to cancer, and that person intentionally withheld the cure, he would be partially responsible for the pain inflicted on the people who would eventually develop cancer (at least those that he would have helped had he acted). Thus, those who prevent a person from being born harm the unborn through their actions (or lack thereof). </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"> </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">There are three principle objections to this line of reasoning. First, it is possible that the use of contraceptives, or an abortion, is predestined. Thus, choosing to not have a child, does not prevent someone from being born since the choice would be part of the overall plan. Further, if one can defy destiny by not having a child, it would be reasonable to infer that one could defy destiny by having a child. If acting against God's will is one's principle concern, both would be equally immoral. Some might object that God's will is always that, if a child can be born, he or she should be conceived. This objection will be dealt with in the third point. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Second, while it may be possible to harm one through inaction, a harm to someone that does not exist is incoherent. For example, it would be wrong to claim that someone who does not exist has cancer, and even more confused to further claim that, by not curing cancer, one has harmed the potential person. The immoral quality of associated with a harm occurs with the advent of that harm. Further, there is an assumption that the “harm” of not existing is worse than other possible harms. Many people could be born into situations such that it would be better had they not been born. For example, supposed a couple is trying to decide whether to have children. They come to learn that, if they have a child, there is 100% certainty that the child will be born with a severe genetic disorder. Not only would we say that the couple should not have the child, it would be wrong for them to have the child with that knowledge.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Third, a conclusion that abstaining from sex is equivalent to murder seems <i>prima facie</i> wrong. Most would say that a couple who decides to wait to have a child until they can afford it is doing the right thing. Additionally, if preventing potential people from being born is murder, then having a child would be also be murder. When a couple decides to have a child this means that they have decided not to have other children that they could have had at another time. Thus, the action would both be an act of murder and not at the same time. Such a conclusion does not answer whether one should have a child, or not, since every answer would be a wrong one. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">These are the reasons why I decided that, if abortion is wrong, it isn't because we are doing a harm to potential persons. Next I'll explain the “at conception” arguments that have the most appeal and why I don't find them persuasive. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Keep the love,</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Ryan</p>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-77120320042156635232011-04-17T14:45:00.000-07:002011-04-17T14:49:21.496-07:00Not Quite Factual: Political Rhetoric and Core Beliefs<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The major news of the past week or so has been about the now infamous statement “[his claim about Plan Parenthood] was not intended to be a factual statement” by senator Jon Kyl (R-Arizona) in response to his claim that over 90% of the work done at Plan Parenthood are abortions. The major news outlets are responding that his response is indicative of the disproportionate attention that political commentators like Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, and pundits like them have received. They feel that these programs, and implicitly Fox News, have been sowing misinformation and political discord which has been negatively affecting the political process. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The two claims that have got my attention are that a) our political environment has become more partisan than it was in the past, and b) the production of misinformation is the source of this partisanship. Arguments about these claims have been circulating for some time. To my knowledge, claim (a) has not been disputed by either side. Rather, both sides claim that the other is responsible for elevating the intensity of the rhetoric and presenting false information. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The vitriol in politics, to my knowledge, is not new. When it comes to disagreements about a topic that many consider central to their system of belief the rhetoric around the debate can get quite ugly. The recent slump in the economy and various attempts to fix the problem have brought some people's opinions about the fiscal policies of the government to the forefront of the national debate. Money, even in less financially difficult times, is a subject that can break up friendships and marriages. It wouldn't be surprising that the intensity of the debate centers around the particular subject material, not the misinformation and spin produced by the political commentators. In short, there isn't a necessary relationship between the pundits and rogue news programs, and the dialogue between disagreeing parties. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">These claims are such that it should be possible to empirically test them. Since there are different countries with relatively similar cultures, but with different news distributors, we could examine the dialogue in other countries and see whether the tone is different. While a different culture might be able to account for some variation between debate within the States and elsewhere, a similarity between these cultures would be indicative of problems with news production. We could also see what the effect of false information has been on a debate. By judging the polarizing effect of information and particular topic within a debate, we should be able to determine if the false information and rhetoric of pundits has a significant affect to a discussions tone. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Since I don't have the resources to do this research, a more conceptual approach to the problem will have to do for the time being. If people form their opinions and act on information received from a reliable source, arguments that use false information to support an argument for the hostile nature of the opposing side would create a more forceful opposition. After all, rallying people against the particular issue is what the argument is intended to do. Why continue to make the arguments if they don't persuade or motivate? </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Some believe that people only reaffirm their beliefs, and turn a blind eye toward facts that might challenge the way they believe. As a result, all people do is motivate their base, but not change their frame of mind. While I agree that this does happen, I also believe that more people are open to changing what they believe than many might suspect. Not only do I consistently read about people who have changed what they believe in the face of new facts or good arguments, but I too have changed my mind a few times on important issues. Changing a firmly held belief is not a quick process, but it does happen.<br /></p><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"> Keep thinking,<br /></p><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Ryan</p>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-43413083157277782972011-04-01T10:51:00.000-07:002011-04-01T10:55:56.842-07:00The Digital Market Place: Finding Work in a the Global Information Market<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The Internet, in the relatively short amount of time that it has been around, has drastically changed the way people do business. Yet, we still haven't fully seen how it will effect the economy in the long term. I think that the future will favor the self-employed, or entrepreneurs. Early on we saw with Napster, and other file sharing programs, that the Internet has allowed for the reduction or elimination of information middle men. In print media, we have seen changes in news agencies, from the outright elimination of some news organizations to a shift to digital distribution for others, and even some self publishing of full books by others. In radio, we see competition with the easy availability of music through portable media players, Internet radio stations like Pandora eliminate the need for a DJ, and podcasting removes the need for the radio company. Finally, television companies, in addition to wrestling with piracy, must learn to accommodate the instant access of Netflix and Hulu. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">This change in the accessibility of information provides an interesting dynamic for people entering into the market place. On the upside, self-employment through the production of some digital medium is cheaper than it ever has been, which means an increased competition among producers, and lower average revenues for one's efforts. The saturation of the market with blogs, for example, makes possible ad revenues in that market relatively small, even though there is a potentially large consumer base. In the end, while it is possible for people to make a living with a blog, podcasts, and/or internet videos, for most, these media will simply supplement one's income.<br /></p><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><br /></p>Best of Luck,<br />RyanReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-13666960161872018552011-03-26T20:14:00.000-07:002011-03-26T20:19:09.167-07:00Voice and Michael Moore<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">This blog was originally written in an essay format. It began “Why be good? The imperative to act as we ought, rather than as we like, looms over our daily interactions, opinions about public policy, and many varieties of social and personal actions.” The essay comes as a reaction to a recent discussion with Nick about ethical relativism. I decided to change voice, and topic somewhat, to accommodate time demands, and possible audience. I still might publish the blog, but I didn't want my consistent ability to get bogged down in details to prevent me from getting something written. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Dez, a friend from High School, has been writing once a day in a blog for the past month. She recently explained that coming up with something to write on a daily basis can be difficult. I certainly sympathize. This is what motivated me to change my writing style from an essay format to something more informal. Coming up with new content on a consistent basis along with doing it in a more rigorous format can be a bit overwhelming. Additionally, few people want to read heady material regularly, daily or otherwise. So, in an effort to be more consistent with my blogs, and stay relateable to a broader audience, a narrative and somewhat schizophrenic blog is what I'm going with for the time being. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">I recently watched Michael Moore's film Roger and Me. I went into the movie not expecting much, and getting much of what I expected. His films, while emotionally quite good, fail to make strong arguments for his positions. Roger and Me details the, more or less, mass exodus of Flint, Michigan after GM decides to move its plants from Flint to Mexico (Moore's claim). Moore holds the position that GM has an obligation to the people of Flint to provide jobs for those who lost work. The film mostly consists of him trying to talk with Roger Smith (the CEO of GM) and following the lives of the people of Flint as they went through the transition. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The problem is that Moore doesn't seem to understand that increased efficiencies in production (and thus more wealth over all) practically necessitates a smaller workforce in that industry. Its debatable whether GM's move out of Flint did make the company more efficient. But, this isn't a topic that Moore addresses in his film. He should have. A convincing case could be made against the move to Mexico. After all, more than likely, GM decided to make the move because they wouldn't have to pay the works as much and worker's rights aren't as well protected in the country (see Walmart). Ensuring that people make a living wage and are not abused are values that many people can get behind. Emotion works for some people. Me, not so much.<br /></p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Rationally yours, </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Ryan</p>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-723974397925367793.post-14611569327702949952011-03-14T14:31:00.001-07:002011-03-14T14:31:59.728-07:00Blog: Introduction<style type="text/css">p { margin-bottom: 0.08in; }</style> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">I don't consider myself a writer. Yet, I find myself writing in a blog, or journal when I get the free time, or writing when I need to work out a problem, personal or otherwise. For a time, I published my writing on myspace. For various reasons that account has fallen into disuse, though it still exists. Sometime ago, I started playing with the idea of publishing my writing once again. I have also been considering publishing videos on youtube to hopefully engage others in a larger debate. I don't know how committed I am to this project. In theory, since I write on a fairly consistent basis anyhow, I should, at the very least, be able to post online in place of writing in my journal. Video publishing is more tenuous due to some technological restrictions, and nervousness about the different format.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">In the long term, it would be great to make a living as a writer. Discounting pay, the lifestyle of a writer has a lot of appeal. They can work from anywhere, and set their own hours. Popular writers have a fame that can be appealing. However, like musicians and other artists, there are far more who are never able to make a living in the market, than those who do. This is why, in part, I am working toward an engineering degree while pursuing this interest on the side. And in fact, many other writers (professors for example) work in other ways while still writing on the side. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">I decided to go with blogger, rather than something like livejournal, or go back to myspace for aesthetic and practical reasons. First, blogger's page layout has a cleaner layout than livejournal, and is roughly comparable to myspace. I actually prefer the default setting in myspace to blogger, but myspace requires that those who wish to comment have accounts. Although many may still have myspace accounts, it is enough of a hassle for dissuade me from publishing on their site. I like the options that livejournal has, and the community that has grown up around the site. But, again, to my knowledge, commenters have an account with livejournal, and I don't like how the pages have been formatted. Finally, I have an email, and youtube account that are linked with the same name. This will hopefully make it easier for others to find me online. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"> My current plan is to publish something once a week that is roughly 500 words. For some reference, the word count of this post up to the words “500 words” is 411 words. This blogs content will mostly be about the various political, economic, and philosophical topics that are on my mind. I hope to try to keep the writing related to whatever is in the national discourse. I will probably foray into religious and ethical subjects. Time will tell, whether we want it to or not. </p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Till next time,</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Ryan</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"> </p>ReasonsDialectichttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15990113542458720495noreply@blogger.com0